| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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When we switched to a file object and not just a simple string, we missed an
update along the way here in target-target conflicts. This patch looks
large, but it really comes down to one errant (char *) cast before that has
been reworked to explicitly point to the alpm_file_t object. The rest is
simply code cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Keep the non-zero return val to let the caller know that the key wasn't
found.
Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Many PKGBUILDs use formatting whitespace when specifying optdepends.
This is removed when adding a package to a repo-database so the
output of "pacman -Si <package>" and "pacman -Qip <package file>"
becomes inconsistent. Instead, do the adjustment when creating
the .PKGINFO file.
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Allow the specification of versioned optdepends with an epoch.
This also (partially) enforces a whitespace between ":" and the
description which is required for the future optdepends parsing
code.
Signed-off-by: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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* All errors now go to stderr, so do the same here and simplify the
writing of the error message.
* Add SIGHUP to the handled signal list, and don't repeat code.
* Attempt to release the transaction (e.g. remove the lock file)
for all of HUP, INT, and TERM. Signals HUP and INT respects
transaction state, TERM will immediately terminate the process.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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A few parameters were outdated or wrongly named, and a few things were
explicitly linked that Doxygen wasn't able to resolve.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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We returned the right error code but never set the flags accordingly.
Also, now that we can bail early, ensure we set the error code.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This adds calls to gpgme_op_import_result() which we were not looking at
before to ensure the key was actually imported. Additionally, we do some
preemptive checks to ensure the keyring is even writable if we are going
to prompt the user to add things to it.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This also fixes a segfault found by dave when key_search is
unsuccessful; the key_search return code documentation has also been
updated to reflect reality.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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We've had a bit of churn since the last time this was done.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Pick up any updates before I push new source messages out to the
service.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This is similar to the 'foo-revoked' file we had. This will be used to
inform the user what keys in the shipped keyring need to be explicitly
trusted by the user.
A distro such as Arch will likely have 3-4 master keys listed in this
trusted file, but an additional 25 developer keys present in the keyring
that the user shouldn't have to directly sign.
We use this list to prompt the user to sign the keys locally. If the key
is already signed locally gpg will print a bit of junk but will continue
without pestering the user.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This was copy-pasted code for the most part once the filename was
factored out.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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We're putting the cart ahead of the horse a bit here. Given that our
keyring is not one where everything is implicitly trusted (ala gpgv),
keeping or deleting a key has no bearing on its trusted status, only
whether we can actually verify things signed by said key.
If we need to address this down the road, we can find a solution that
works for the problem at hand rather than trying to solve it now before
signing is even widespread.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Unlike our protégé apt-key, removing a key from our keyring is not
sufficient to prevent it from being trusted or used for verification. We
are better off flagging it as disabled and leaving it in the keyring so
it cannot be reimported or fetched at a later date from a keyserver and
continue to be used.
Implement the logic to disable the key instead of delete it, figuring
out --command-fd in the process.
Note that the surefire way to disable a key involves including said key
in the keyring package, such that it is both in foobar.gpg and
foobar-revoked.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Because we aren't using gpgv and a dedicated keyring that is known to be
all safe, we should honor this flag being set on a given key in the
keyring to know to not honor it. This prevents a key from being
reimported that a user does not want to be used- instead of deleting,
one should mark it as disabled.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This finishes the cleanup started in 710e83999bbf. We can do a straight
import from another keyring rather than all the funky parsing and piping
business we were doing.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Otherwise we're hiding extremely relevant bits like this one:
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Rather than saying it was invalid, tell the user no signature exists.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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* Ensure usage message is indented correctly
* Show short filenames for both the gpg keyring and revocation file
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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When doing something like `pacman-key --edit-key 'Dan McGee'`, one would
expect it to work, and not fail.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Add two new static methods, key_search() and key_import(), to our
growing list of signing code.
If we come across a key we do not have, attempt to look it up remotely
and ask the user if they wish to import said key. If they do, flag the
validation process as a potential 'retry', meaning it might succeed the
next time it is ran.
These depend on you having a 'keyserver hkp://foo.example.com' line in
your gpg.conf file in your gnupg home directory to function.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This moves the result processing out of the validation check loop itself
and into a new loop. Errors will be presented to the user one-by-one
after we fully complete the validation loop, so they no longer overlap
the progress bar.
Unlike the database validation, we may have several errors to process in
sequence here, so we use a function-scoped struct to track all the
necessary information between seeing an error and asking the user about
it.
The older prompt_to_delete() callback logic is still kept, but only for
checksum failures. It is debatable whether we should do this at all or
just delegate said actions to the user.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This is for eventual use by the PGP key import code. Breaking this into
a separate commit now makes the following patches a bit easier to
understand.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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pm_asprintf() does not return a length as asprintf() does. Fail. Make
sure it is not -1 as that is the only failure condition.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Just a helpful warning for those users in this unenviable position.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Before:
$ pacman -Si pacman
error: invalid value for 'SigLevel' : 'FooValue'
After:
$ ./src/pacman/pacman -Si pacman
error: config file /etc/pacman.conf, line 88: invalid value for 'SigLevel' : 'FooValue'
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This allows some message reuse, as well as making it clear to
translators what *not* to translate.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Only allow turning it on if the backend library has support for it.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This allows a frontend program to query, at runtime, what the library
supports. This can be useful for sanity checking during config-
requiring a downloader or disallowing signature settings, for example.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This takes the libraries hidden default out of the equation: hidden in
the sense that we can't even find out what it is until we create a
handle. This is a chicken-and-egg problem where we have probably already
parsed the config, so it is hard to get the bitmask value right.
Move it to the frontend so the caller can do whatever the heck they
want. This also exposes a shortcoming where the frontend doesn't know if
the library even supports signatures, so we should probably add a
alpm_capabilities() method which exposes things like HAS_DOWNLOADER,
HAS_SIGNATURES, etc.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This allows us to do all delta verification up front, followed by
whatever needs to be done with any found errors. In this case, we call
prompt_to_delete() for each error.
Add back the missing EVENT(ALPM_EVENT_DELTA_INTEGRITY_DONE) that
accidentally got removed in commit 062c391919e93f1d6.
Remove use of *data; we never even look at the stuff in this array for
the error code we were returning and this would be much better handled
by one callback per error anyway, or at least some strongly typed return
values.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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If siglist->results wasn't a NULL pointer, we would try to free it
anyway, even if siglist->count was zero. Only attempt to free this
pointer if we had results and the pointer is valid.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This one can be overwhelming when reading debug output from a very large
package. We already have the output of each extracted file so we
probably can do without this in 99.9% of cases.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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alpm_list_count() returns size_t, which we should use to store the
result since it is easy enough to format for printing.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This adds two new static methods, check_validity() and load_packages(),
to sync.c which are simply code fragments pulled out of our
do-everything sync commit code.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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In reality, there is no retrying that happens as of now because we don't
have any import or changing of the keyring going on, but the code is set
up so we can drop this in our new _alpm_process_siglist() function. Wire
up the basics to the sync database validation code, so we see something
like the following:
$ pacman -Ss unknowntrust
error: core: signature from "Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>" is unknown trust
error: core: signature from "Dan McGee <dpmcgee@gmail.com>" is unknown trust
error: database 'core' is not valid (invalid or corrupted database (PGP signature))
$ pacman -Ss missingsig
error: core: missing required signature
error: core: missing required signature
error: database 'core' is not valid (invalid or corrupted database (PGP signature))
Yes, there is some double output, but this should be fixable in the
future.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This will make its way up the call chain eventually to allow trusting
and importing of keys as necessary.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This adds a some new callback event and progress codes for package
loading, which was formerly bundled in with package validation before.
The main sync.c loop where loading occurred is now two loops running
sequentially. The behavior should not change with this patch outside of
progress and event display; more changes will come in following patches.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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_alpm_pkg_load_internal() was becoming a monster. Extract the top bit of
the method that dealt with checksum and signature validation into a
separate method that should be called before one loads a package to
ensure it is valid.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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Do this outside the loop to prevent the message from being displayed
(and pluralized!) for each individual package.
Signed-off-by: Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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None of these are hot-code paths, and at least the target reading has
little need for an arbitrary length limitation (however crazy it might
be to have longer arguments).
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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This variable was totally unused.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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No need for the indirection; just access ->data instead.
Signed-off-by: Dan McGee <dan@archlinux.org>
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